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On January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed Executive
Order 10988, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service.
This Order initiated a new era in the public policy on unionization
of federal government workers and collective bargaining in the public
service.
The purpose of this study was to trace the history of the policy
on labor-management relations in the public service, to assess the
effects of the new policy embodied in Executive Order 10988, to indulge
in some reasoned conjecture as to the future course of U. S. policy,
and to discuss the necessity for the Civil Engineer Corps Officer to
acquire some expertise in the field of labor relations.
The conclusions of the study are that the area of labor-management
relations in the federal government will be of increasing importance to
the federal manager in the future, that the policy of the United States
for federal employee-management relations will continue along the liberal
path established by Executive Order 10988 with the distinct possibility
of statutory recognition of government employee unions and of the
government's duty to bargain collectively with the employee organizations,
that the government workers may be given a limited right to strike in the
not too distant future, and that there is an indisputable necessity for
the Civil Engineer Corps Officer to acquire expertise in labor relations
if he is to be an effective "Engineer-Manager."
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Section 1 - Introduction
On January 17, 1962 a new era dawned in the field of federal
employee-management relations. On that day President John F. Kennedy
issued Executive Order 10988. The Order represented a drastic departure
from past government policy concerning employee-management relations
within its own house. The impact of this Order, I believe, has proven
to be comparable to the impact of the Wagner Act in the private enter-
prise economy. The Wagner Act inagurated "industrial democracy" in the
United States in 1935 and it is the path our industrial relations policy
has followed to this day.
It is strange, therefore, to consider the fact that the principles
applied in the private sector were not extended to the government's own
employees until President Kennedy acted in early 1962. Why did the
United States have a "double standard" for government workers and private
workers in the first place? Why did it take so long for the government
to change its policies for government workers? What is the present
policy? What is the policy likely to be in the future? One purpose of
this thesis is to seek the answers to the above questions.
The author is also an officer in the Civil Engineer Corps of the
United States Navy. Stemming from this professional connection are two
other purposes of this thesis.
One of these purposes is to provide a "mini-text" on federal
employee-management relations which can be read quickly by Civil Engineer
Corps Officers to give them a general acquaintence with this facet of
their professional careers. The second purpose is to look into the
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requirement or lack of requirement for training in employee-management
relations for Civil Engineer Corps Officers.
I believe the importance of these latter two purposes can be
established by considering the personnel environment in which the Civil
Engineer Corps Officer works. With the exception of Seabee billets and
military staff billets, the Civil Engineer Corps Officer is always
involved far more in the management of civilian personnel than he is
in the management of military personnel. Today, when many of these
civilian employees belong to unions and when union membership of govern-
ment employees is increasing, it behooves the Civil Engineer Corps
Officer to have at least an exposure to the evolution of government
employee-management relations policy if he is to effectively discharge
his management responsibilities.
Section 2 - Policy Prior to 10988
With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, the
United States made a revolutionary change in its policy concerning
unionization. Prior to this act the national policy was shaped almost
entirely by common law. This common law held property rights and the
right of contract to be of a higher value than the civil rights of the
individual worker and his fellows. Consequently the common law was very
much anti-union and unions had very little success in organizing and
improving the conditions of the workingman in the United States.
49 Stat. 452. Commonly known as the Wagner Act.
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The Wagner Act signalled a drastic change in the nation's policy.
This act instituted the completely new concept of positively approving
and promoting the unionization of the workers. With the implementation
of this policy, unionization of employees in the United States began a
long period of expansion lasting until the middle fifties. Membership
in unions reached a peak of 18.5 million in 1956, then declined steadily
until 1964. By 1966 the trend was reversed with the unions registering
a gain of a million members over the 1964 figures.
In the light of the philosophy of encouraging unionization and
subsequent collective bargaining with the employer in the private sector,
the treatment of federal government employees is a most interesting
anomaly. Here is the interesting situation where the very agency which
has taken the lead (indeed the whip) in bestowing the advantages of
collective bargaining in the private sector - the federal government -
has, until relatively recently, denied even encouragement to union organ-
ization of its own employees. To this day there is only one piece of
2legislation applying to unionization of federal employees. It is to
this anomaly that I wish to address myself in this first part of this
thesis.
Why is this dichotomous approach of the federal government to an
overall policy on labor-management relations of any importance? I
believe it is important because of two primary factors. These factors
Paul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, Personnel Administration (6th ed.
;
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 215.
2
37 Stat. 555. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912.
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are the rapid increase in the number of government employees on the one
hand and the increasingly militant assertion of group demands on the
other.
Since 1930 the percentage of the work force in the public sector
has doubled and in 1962 totaled over nine million people. Although most
of this increase was in local government, the federal government has
participated heavily in the increase. In 1962 about 25 percent - over
2
two million people - worked in federal agencies. In the years prior to
World War II, there was a maximum of about nine hundred thousand federal
3
employees. These figures show the existence of a large and growing
source of future union members and given the present trend of more and
more federal involvement in an increasing number of programs of social
welfare, it is practically inevitable that the number of federal
employees will continue to increase.
The second factor of increasingly militant assertion of group demands
finds a particular type of outlet in the labor movement. Occupational
groups which have traditionally been, at very best, apathetic toward
unionization are having second thoughts. Professional groups and public
employees are beginning to behave in "... ways which suggest that they
Russell A. Smith and Doris B. McLaughlin, "Public Employment: A
Neglected Area of Research and Training in Labor Relations," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review , Vol. 16, No. 1 (October, 1962), p. 30.
2
Joseph Krislov, "The Independent Public Employee Association:
Characteristics and Functions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review
,
Vol. 15, No. 4 (July, 1962), p. 549.
3
Minutes of Meeting of the Federal Conference of Employee Relations
Officers, April 24, 1956. Cited in Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining
in the Federal Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 215,
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may have learned something from other unionists. They have successfully
experimented with strikes and work stoppages as an effective way to
ensure favorable action on their 'requests'."
Now that the government's ambivalent approach to organization of
federal employees has been stated and the reasons given why this approach
is important to the consideration of a proper public policy in this area,
I think it would be well to examine the existing policy framework and how
it developed. In the process of this examination, answers will be sought
to the questions asked in the introduction about government industrial
relations policy for federal employees.
In sharp contrast to the 34 years of existence of the Wagner Act, it
is only within the last 20 years that there has been any serious consid-
eration given to revision of federal government labor relations policies
to conform more to that which exists in the private sector. Prior to
that time it was generally thought that there were unique factors in
government employment which made "industrial democracy" infeasible.
Because this "infeasibility" left them no recourse, the government
employees attempted to achieve better wages and working conditions by
lobbying in Congress.
This high pressure lobbying was regarded with pronounced distaste
by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. They reacted
by issuing executive orders which prohibited federal employees from
petitioning Congress, either individually or collectively, or from
Pigors and Myers, p. 85. See also Waldo G. Bowman, "Engineers in




providing information to Congress or its committees except through the
head of the department or as authorized by him.
These Executive Orders, known as the "gag rules" were in effect
until 1912 when Congress invalidated them with the passage of the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act. This act provided protection for federal employees from
reprisals for joining employee organizations and for their right to
petition Congress. The act applied only to postal unions as those were
the only government employee unions existing at that time. It has been
construed, in practice, to apply to all government employee unions.
2
The Wagner Act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 excluded
government employees from coverage by means of the definition of "employee"
and "employer." There is nothing in the acts or the legislative history
of the acts to indicate that it was intended that federal employees be
prohibited from entering into voluntary bargaining relationships with the
government. Such action, however, was definitely not encouraged. Section
305 of the Taft-Hartley Act made it unlawful for a federal employee to
2
strike or participate in any strike against the government. This provi-
3
sion was superseded in 1955 by Public Law 330 which made striking a
felony and added a provision extending the proscription to belong to any
organization of government employees which asserted the right to strike.








Before going on to the legislative attempts to extend the benefits
of true industrial collective bargaining to government employees, it
would be well to examine those "unique" aspects of government employment
which were commonly accepted as barring such a policy. After examining
these bars and discussing the defenses and criticisms of the government's
policy, we will return to a discussion of legislative efforts to change
the government policy.
Probably the two most common "unique" aspects of government employ-
ment are the concept of the "sovereign immunity" and the doctrine that
delegated powers cannot be redelegated.
The "sovereign immunity" holds that the government is the repository
of all coercive power and as such is immune to any action taken against
it without its consent. This has been used as a justification for the
government not bargaining with its own employees. However, in actual
practice, the U. S. Government has effectively relinquished its sovereign
immunity. The Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution reads "... nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined to give the
doctrine the final death blow while conceding "... that there is no
better reason for the doctrine than 'that it was laid down in the time
2
of Henry IV. 1 " Thus in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the
doctrine prevents any action by employees to compel the government to
See also 10 Stat. 612 which established the Court of Claims;
60 Stat. 843, the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946; and 62 Stat. 933, the






enter into collective bargaining. On the other hand, it does not prevent
voluntary collective bargaining.
The doctrine concerning delegation of powers can be succinctly
summarized in these words:
Two general rules are valid guides to judicial decision:
1. Legislative powers may not be delegated to private
groups of persons.
2. An executive officer or commission to whom legisla-
tive powers have been properly delegated may not
delegate those powers to someone else.-*-
Judging by the judicial decisions in this area it
... appears that the constitutional rules on delegation
and redelegation do not preclude the validity of laws
to enable the development of public service collective
bargaining relationships. To be valid, however, they
should contain procedural systems which safeguard
exclusive authority for the executive agent to dis-
approve rules before they become effective and which
retain in the executive agency the legal power not
only to decide independently but also to rescind,
modify, and supersede the rule unilaterally at any
future time.
Aside from these "unique" aspects of government employment, there
has been rather sustained criticism of the government's federal employee
industrial relations policy. The Hoover Commission commented that
The Government has lagged behind American Industry in
improving employer-employee relations. Federal employ-





2William B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal
Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966J , p. 25.
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abuse, discrimination, and unjust treatment, are not
provided a positive opportunity to participate in the
formulation of policies and practices which affect their
welfare. The President should require the heads of
departments to provide for employee participation in the
formulation and improvement of Federal personnel policies
and practices
.
The American Bar Association also criticized the government for lagging
2behind industry when it should be setting an example. The Metal Trades
Department of the AFL-CIO called for equity and fair play to give
3government employees the same rights it had urged on industry.
Noted scholars and writers have also contributed their criticisms.
... public employees are more and more experiencing
the contagious influence of this [collective bargain-
ing] movement.
Another writer points out that all the legislation has tended toward
prohibiting strikes and contends that support and criticisms by employee
groups benefit the merit system. Gregory, among others, has often
The Hoover Commission Report (Washington, D. C. : Government Print-
ing Office, 1949), pp. 125-128.
2
"ABA 1955 Proceedings of the Section of Labor Relations Law,
Second Report of the Committee on Labor Relations of Governmental
Employees," pp. 2-5.
3
James A. Brownlow, President of Metal Trades Department, AFL-CIO
in "Hearings on H. R. 6 before the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service," 85th Cong., 2d Sess. , 1958, pp. 157-162. Hereinafter
cited as "1958 Hearings."
4
0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1956), pp. 281-282.
William Seal Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service
Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 58-78.
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criticized Congress for its enactment of Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley
Act prohibiting strikes by U. S. Government employees.
New York City arrived at the conclusion that they should adopt
collective bargaining for the city employees because
Human nature is such that paternalism, no matter how
bounteous its gifts, may be of less real satisfaction
than the process of reasoning together around the family
table, no matter how meager the fare.
Basically then, the criticisms of the government's policy can be
condensed to four major points: (1) the government's approach has always
been negative, (2) the philosophy has been paternalistic, (3) the govern-
ment should be a model employer and not a laggard, and (4) in the
interest of equity the government should at least use the same policies
it compels private industry to use.
The nature of the "sovereign immunity" and the delegation of powers
concept have already been discussed. They form one line of defense of
the government's policy. In addition there were at least three other
reasonable arguments for the defense. One popular one was the assertion
that management had already voluntarily granted employees the benefits
of collective bargaining. Another is that Congress deliberately excluded
federal workers from coverage of the National Labor Relations Act and
therefore intended to deny collective bargaining to federal workers. The
Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law (New York: Norton & Company,
1958), pp. 521-523.
2
"Report on a Program of Labor Relations for New York City
Employees," (New York: Dept. of Labor, 1957), pp. 83-84.
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third argument was that employees' wages, hours and working conditions
are all set by legislation and hence the employer (in this case the
executive branch) cannot bargain collectively with the employees.
The earlier discussion of judicial views of "sovereign immunity"
and delegation of powers has already provided the rebuttal to their use
as defenders of the status quo. The unions would not admit the slightest
validity in the argument that management had already granted them the
benefits of collective bargaining - particularly in the era before
Executive Order 10988. Granting that the exclusion of government
employees from coverage of the NLRA was consistent with the government's
negative approach, it is at least arguable that this was no justification
for executives to bury their heads in the sand for another 15 years after
the passage of the NLRA. The defense of the executives being powerless
to bargain collectively with employees' organizations is partially valid.
However, this defense does not allow for the fact that there is con-
siderable leeway for bargaining on these matters within the legislated
framework.
The above discussion has pointed out, in general terms, the
criticisms and defenses of the government's policy on industrial relations
for its own employees. In order to be a little more specific, let's
examine the opinions and actions of those very powerful individuals -
the Presidents.
None of the four Presidents who preceeded Kennedy - Hoover, Roosevelt,
Truman, or Eisenhower - attempted to promote changes in the policy con-
cerning federal employees. Hoover, while campaigning for the presidency
in 1928, said the government "... must limit them in the liberty to
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bargain for their own wages, for no government employee can strike
against his government and thus against the whole people." President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a letter to the President of the National
Federation of Federal Employees, said "All government employees should
realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood,
2
cannot be transplanted into the public service."
It is interesting to note here that Hoover changed his mind in the
years between his Presidency and 1949 when he delivered his "Hoover
3
Report." Roosevelt, when he was Secretary of the Navy, "urged all
government workers to organize for their own betterment and to assist
co-ordination with management."
The only action which could be interpreted as being affirmative was
taken during the Eisenhower Administration. This was a letter from the
Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management to all
agency heads. The letter emphasized the need for good employee-management
relations in the federal service and asked that each agency head evaluate
this aspect of the agency's operation. This letter marked the first
time that an administration had even hinted that the unions might have a
Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen Press,
1948), p. 6, note 6.
2
Hart, p. 22. Citing Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 Vol . (1941), p. 325.
3
Page 12 of this paper.
Commander Chantee Lewis, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor
Relations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (March, 1965), p. 64.




role to play in the federal government. This move was apparently made
in lieu of issuing a proposed Executive Order drafted in 1954 which
would have required government agencies to recognize employee unions
and to deal with them.
The Judicial Branch has rendered many decisions relative to public
employees and although there is some diversity in the opinions,
... there appears to have been sufficient consistency
in the decisions to support the conclusion that the
following general principles are well settled and appli-
cable to any governmental body, federal, state, or local:
1. Laws and executive regulations which prohibit govern-
mental employees, upon pain of dismissal from the
service, from joining a union or from engaging in any
other form of concerted activity such as striking, picket-
ing, and collective bargaining are valid and binding.
They do not constitute an unconstitutional infringement
upon the civil rights and liberties of the employees
concerned.
2. In the absence of any prohibitory statute or
regulation, public employees may organize or join
unions, including unions which are affiliated with
national labor organizations such as the AFL-CIO.
3. Any type of closed shop, union shop, or other form
of union security agreement between a government agency
and a union representing its employees is invalid.
A. Any agreement that union members will be given
preference in hiring, firing, reductions in force,
promotion, or other employment benefit or privilege is
invalid.
5. Any agreement for automatic check-off of union dues,
absent a specific written assignment from each individual
employee concerned is invalid.
Hearings on S. 3593 before the Senate Committee on Post Office and






Now that the general climate of attitudes and policy has been
examined and the interpretation of the courts summarized, let us return
to a discussion of legislative efforts concerning federal employee-
management relations.
Beginning in 1949 and continuing until 1961 many attempts were
made to give statutory recognition to federal employee unions. Repre-
sentative George M. Rhodes and Senator Olin D. Johnston submitted bills,
in the form of amendments to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, in each session
of Congress attempting to give statutory recognition to the government
employee unions. Committee hearings were held in the House in 1952 and
in 1956 and in the Senate in 1956. In 1952 and in 1956 the bill was
reported out favorably by the committees but neither house of Congress
ever voted on the bill. The failure of the bill to pass was probably
primarily due to opposition of the administration.
The Rhodes-Johnston bill provided, among other things, for the right
of an employee union to represent its members in dealings with a govern-
ment department or agency. Other essential provisions of the bill are
quoted below:
(2) (A) Within six months after the effective date of
this Act, the head of each department and agency shall
promulgate regulations specifying that administrative
officers shall at the request of officers or representa-
tives of the employees' organizations confer with such
officers or representatives on matters of policy
affecting working conditions, safety, in-service train-
ing, labor-management cooperation, methods of adjusting
h\. R. Report No. 2311, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) and Senate
Report No. 2635, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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grievances, transfers, appeals, granting of leave,
promotions, demotions, rates of pay, and reduction in
force. Such regulations shall recognize the right of
such officers or representatives to carry on any lawful
activity, without intimidation, coercion, interference,
or reprisal.
(B) Disputes resulting from unresolved grievances or
from disagreement between employee organizations and
departments or agencies on the policies enumerated in
subsection (e) (2) (A) [directly above] shall be referred
to an impartial board of arbitration to be composed of
one representative of the department or agency, one
representative of the employee organization, and one
representative appointed by the Secretary of Labor who
shall serve as chairman. The findings of the board of
arbitration shall be final and conclusive.
(3) Charges involving a violation of this subsection
shall be referred to the Civil Service Commission, which
shall be charged with making certain that effective
grievance machinery is established within each agency,
and that unresolved differences are referred promptly to
the impartial arbitration board established in subsection
(e) (2) (B). The head of the department or agency
involved shall take such action as may be necessary to
cause the suspension, demotion, or removal of any
administrative official found by the board of arbitration
to have violated this subsection. ..
1
Spokesmen for the administration claimed the Rhodes-Johnston Bill
was unnecessary since the agencies had already decreed consultation with
employee organizations. They stated that granting union officers the
right to "carry on any lawful activity" was too broad a power and could
2paralyze operations. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
contended that under a strict interpretation of the statute a cabinet
member could be dismissed if he made a ruling on "lawful activity" which
1
S. 95, H. R. 6, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
2
"1958 Hearings," p. 289.
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was later reversed by an arbitration board. The supporters of the
measure did not challenge this contention. The wording of the bill and
the testimony by union leaders made it clear that
Under the Rhodes Bill management would be compelled to
confer and, at the discretion of the union - any union
that represented any employees in the department - to
arbitrate any policy decision. The variety of policy
decisions which any union could force to arbitration
is infinite. 2
The unions' general approach on this bill was typified by AFL-CIO
President George Meany:
Federal employee organizations are asking for the
assurance that they will enjoy the benefits of a pro-
gram for cooperating with management. They are not
seeking the same kind of collective bargaining in
which unions engage in private industry , the objective
of which is a bilateral agreement with respect to
specific working conditions. [emphasis supplied]
The reader would do well to mentally mark this passage for later recall.
It will, when coupled with later statements of Mr. Meany, demonstrate
the wisdom of taking labor's protestations with a grain of salt.
In summary of the policy prior to Executive Order 10988, it can be
said that it was essentially a negativist and paternalistic approach.
There was no positive encouragement of organization by the federal
employees and there was no policy except that of voluntary consultation




1956 Hearings, p. 281.
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with the employees. In the absence of any statutory prohibition,
employees were free to organize, but there was no way to compel the
government to bargain with or even to recognize the employees 1 organi-
zations.
Section 3 - Executive Order 10988
Thus it was that prior to 1962, federal employees and managers
lacked uniform guidance as to government policy in the area of collective
bargaining. President Kennedy, therefore, appointed a President's Task
Force to formulate government-wide policy recommendations. The members
of the Task Force were:
Arthur Goldberg David E. Bell, Director
Secretary of Labor Bureau of the Budget
Chairman
John W. Macy, Jr. J. Edward Day
Chairman, Civil Service Postmaster General
Commission
Robert F. McNamara Theodore C. Sorenson
Secretary of Defense Special Counsel to the
President
In the process of developing the recommendations for the Executive
Order, the Task Force held open hearings in Washington, D. C. , Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, San Francisco and New York City. In general
the employee organization representatives felt that the absence of a
positive government policy had made it difficult, if not impossible, for
A Policy for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service
,
Report of the President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in
the Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961),
p. vii. Hereinafter referred to as the Task Force Report .
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the executive leadership to infuse into its agencies a cooperative spirit
in employee-management relations.
The AFL-CIO wanted recognition limited to "bona fide national
unions," exclusive recognition for a majority union, binding arbitration
2
of disputes, and dues check-off. Other unions, such as the National
Federation of Federal employees, desired that each organization represent
3
its own members, no exclusive recognition, and no arbitration. Basically
the AFL-CIO views and desires prevailed.
One Task Force position was especially important and was to have a
nearly disastrous consequence for the NFFE. The Task Force agreed that
as a minimum "no management official and no personnel officer should
4
hold office in any employee organization." That consequence will be
examined in a later portion of the paper.
The gist of the Task Force findings and the thrust of their recom-
mendations was found in their letter of transmittal.
At the present time the Federal Government has no
Presidential policy on employee-management relations,
or at least no policy beyond the barest acknowledge-
ment that such relations ought to exist. Lacking
guidance, the various agencies of the government have
proceeded on widely varying courses. Some have
established extensive relations with employee organi-
zations; most have done little; a number have done
President's Task Force, Staff Report III, Summary of Testimony ,








Task Force Report, p. 8.
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nothing. The Task Force is firmly of the opinion that
in large areas of the government we are yet to take
advantage of this means of enlisting the creative
energies of government workers in the formulation of
policies that shape the conditions of their work.^
This passage expresses the heart of the program as it was worked out by
the Task Force as they tried to balance the public and private interests.
Reporting on November 30, 1961, the Task Force made a comprehensive
set of recommendations which were adopted in their entirety by President
Kennedy, in the issuance of Executive Order 10988 in January of 1962. It
contained none of the objectionable features of the Rhodes-Johnston Bill
and it brought the rights of federal employees into line, as much as
possible, with the rights of workers and unions in private industry.
The Task Force recommended that the Department of Labor and the
Civil Service Commission jointly prepare a "Code of Fair Labor Practices"
and a "Standard of Conduct for Employee Organizations" to parallel the
2
standards established for unions and management in private industry.
In establishing these guidelines, the President wanted them to assist
in the implementation of Executive Order 10988 by stating the responsi-
bilities of unions and management, by giving criteria for the protection









p. 27. See also Executive Order 10988, Section 13.
3
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
The White House, Washington, May 21, 1963.
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Considering the background which has been discussed in the
preceeding pages, the issuance of Executive Order 10988 by President
Kennedy establishing a program for recognition of federal employee
unions and requiring the development of administrative machinery for
dealing with them looked like an extremely precipitous action on his
part. Indeed, the Executive Order was a move that
... pulled the rug from under the government unions
just as they were about to pluck the golden apple. It
not only deprived them of the prize but made them like
it! It gave them what they said they wanted (recogni-
tion) while it deprived them of the windfall they hoped
would come with it (a law which would compel all but
employees of extraordinary independence to join a union).
As a result of the Executive Order, the pressure for the
Rhodes Bill - near the bursting point in 1961 - has been
completely dissipated.
Both the federal executives and the federal employee unions' leaders
objected to the Executive Order. The executives objected because they
thought a formal program unnecessary and that any such program required
legislative action by Congress. The labor leaders objected because they
were not really looking forward to having to do the hard, demanding and
expensive work of competing openly at the grass roots level for members
and the right to represent the workers in a given unit. They would have
been just as happy to have the Rhodes-Johnston Bill and to have continued
their negotiations in the friendly halls of Congress.
Wilson R. Hart, "The U. S. Civil Service Learns to Live with
Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal," Industrial Relations
Review
, Vol. 17, No. 2 (January, 1964), p. 205.
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There is little doubt that one consideration in the issuance of the
Executive Order was a desire on the part of the administration to fore-
stall the passage of a bill which they considered unwise. Another
important factor not to be overlooked, however, was President Kennedy's
philosophy in regard to federal employee-management relations. He had
stated, while still a Senator, his position in favor of giving statutory
recognition to federal employee organizations. Important also was the
fact that President Kennedy had a very deep knowledge of labor matters.
He had been a member of Senator McClellan's investigative committee which
had probed abuses of power by the labor unions and he had 14 years
service on House and Senate labor committees. In view of these factors,
the issuance of the Order was precipitous only in that the President
decided to take the initiative and use the Executive Order as his means.
The catalytic role of President Kennedy's Task Force has been
discussed. Their role in the evolution of the government's policy should
not be underestimated. They did their work swiftly, unanimously agreed
on a sweeping revision in policy and persuaded the President to adopt
their proposed program in its entirety. This was all done in, for
Washington, the extremely short time of six months, and the Executive
Order was issued just a bit over a month later. By his decisive
assumption of the initiative, President Kennedy averted seemingly unwise
legislation and got the executive branch moving on a new labor policy
for government workers much faster than would have happened under
Statement of Senator John F. Kennedy in 1956 Hearings, p. 36.
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legislation. Now we turn to a comparison of the policy for private
enterprise and that for government employees.
Section A - Comparative Analysis of 10988
In this section of the paper, no attempt will be made to compare
the detailed provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act and
Executive Order 10988. Rather, the intent is to compare only the very
basic philosophies of the two policies and to make a comment or two
about a desirable policy.
Basically, national labor policy in the private sector is founded
on three philosophical tenets. These are (1) there should be positive
encouragement for workers to organize, (2) there should be exclusive
representation based on the majority rule principle, and (3) employers
should be required to bargain with employee organizations chosen for that
purpose by the employees.
Stemming from these tenets, set forth in the Labor Management
Relations Act, a whole body of judicial law and administrative rule has
developed over the years to ensure that the philosophy is implemented in
an equitable manner. In attempting to achieve their objectives, the
unions can use the strike, boycott (but not the secondary boycott), and
picketing as bargaining weapons. Private employers are compelled to
bargain and the collective agreement is the desired and usual result.
In contrast, the national policy for federal employees prior to
Executive Order 10988, as discussed in preceeding pages, was decidedly
out of date. Courts had long held that a legislative body could legally
prohibit membership in a union by a public employee. In the absence of
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such a limitation, membership was lawful. Even where membership was
lawful, the employer was not required to bargain. Universally strikes
and other forms of economic coercion have been held illegal.
How much has Executive Order 10988 changed this policy? First, the
Order falls short of the first tenet of the LMRA. The Order specifies
that the employer should be completely neutral with regard to the
question of union membership. Secondly, the Order, though it does abide
by the second tenet of exclusive representation, allows other forms of
recognition for organizations other than the exclusive representative
to exist concurrently. Thus, the Order allowed three categories of
recognition - exclusive, formal, and informal. Further comment on this
feature will be made in a later section. Thirdly, the Order requires
collective negotiations between the employer and an exclusive representa-
tive. A written agreement is an appropriate result of these negotiations,
Executive Order 10988 thus went a long way toward establishing the
same privileges for federal employees as private employees enjoy. The
prohibition on strikes and the use of other economic weapons as a
bargaining tactic was reaffirmed as appropriate public policy by the
2
Task Force. The matters subject to negotiations are, of course, more
severely proscribed by existing legislation than in the private sector.
In the next section, we will discuss some of the results of Executive
Order 10988.







Section 5 - Subsequent to 10988
On the part of labor two reactions are extremely interesting. In
general, the AFL-CIO, with their long experience in the rough and tumble
of industrial relations in private industry, immediately mounted
organizing campaigns and wherever possible pushed for exclusive recogni-
tion. The American Federation of Government Employees wholeheartedly
joined the competition in organizing even though it brought them into
conflict with the established craft unions which claimed jurisdiction
over their respective craftsmen in the government. This competition has
been very evident between the AFGE and District 44 of the International
Association of Machinists of the AFL-CIO. District 44 was established
in 1944 by the IAM for the specific purpose of organizing federal
government craftsmen. Thus, even within the AFL-CIO, the conflict
between the industrial union such as AFGE and the craft union exists
in the government sphere as it does in the private sphere.
Representing the other extreme was the National Federation of
Federal Employees. Here the reader should recall the earlier comment
about the nearly disastrous effect the prohibition on supervisors and
management personnel holding union office was to have on one government
union. Because so many of the NFFE's officers were supervisors and
managers, Mr. Vaux Owens, the national president, felt that the conflict
of interest provisions of the Order would deprive the union of all its
leadership and lead directly to its demise. Accordingly, he resisted
"T-tloyd Ulman, ed. , Challenges to Collective Bargaining (Inglewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 67.

-29-
the program to the utmost and instructed the local lodges not to attempt
to gain exclusive recognition.
The NFFE even petitioned the U. S. District Court in Washington,
D. C. to declare Executive Order 10988 invalid and void on the ground
that "it was not authorized by any law or statute of the United States
and was not within the constitutional authority of the President." This
tactic failed and led to the selection of a new president, Mr. Nathan T.
Wolkomir, at the 27th Convention of NFFE in September, 1964. Mr. Wolkomir
immediately reversed the policy and declared that henceforth they would
2
"use rather than fight" Executive Order 10988.
Willem Vos loo's extensive investigation, by means of a great many
interviews of government and labor representatives, determined that
... although union-management dealings took place prior
to the Executive Order, they found that management
officials were more receptive to them than before.
As a result union leaders felt that they now had
greater status in performance of their representative
roles and functions.
3
Mr. Vosloo's own conclusion was that "On the whole, union officials
exhibited an optimistic attitude toward the prospect of the new program."
"Text of NFFE Complaint in Suit to Invalidate Executive Order
10988," Government Employee Relations Report
,
No. 40 (June 15, 1964),
pp. F1-F9.
2
Vosloo, pp. 133-145. Quotation from page 133.
3
Ibid . Quotation from p. 143.
4
Ibid . Quotation from p. 144.
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He found it clear that top management supported the program with very
few isolated individuals in opposition.
In general, the unions' primary complaints were expressed in their
desire to have an impartial appeals procedure going beyond the head of
an agency which is an interested party in a dispute, and a new independ-
ent committee or agency to administer the program and to interpret the
program provisions. Vosloo concluded that the experience under the Order
does not support the need for another bureaucracy to administer the
program. He does state, however, that he is in agreement with the need
2
of some kind of arbitration machinery for resolving impasses.
Another author who had previously done an exhaustive study in
federal labor relations, writing in 1964, declared that considering
the
... enthusiastic support of the President, the Cabinet,
and most interested members of the public, and at least
the tacit approval of the Congress and the federal
judiciary ...-*










Hart, "An Interim Appraisal," p. 209. Also see Wilson R. Hart,
"The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review
,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (January, 1966), pp. 175-189.

-31-
found essentially the same thing with regard to management and labor
representatives' attitudes toward Executive Order 10988.
George Meany, President of the AFL-C10, indicated that the AFL-CIO
had made great progress under the Executive Order. He did, however,
complain that the "higher authorities" too often substituted their
unilateral judgments for what the bargainers had worked out in their
negotiating sessions. Mr. Meany complained about some remaining
vestiges of paternalism and stated that some way of resolving negotiation
2impasses must be found.
A more specific criticism was given by Otto Pragan of the AFL-CIO.
He began by stating that
Collective bargaining in the Federal service, at the
present time, differs from that in private industry,
principally in these points: 1) Scope of bargaining
issues is limited by laws and regulations; 2) The use
of the economic weapon of the strike is not allowed;
3) Arbitration is not final and binding; 4) To become
effective the local agreement requires approval by the
head of the agency; 5) There is no independent govern-
mental board to decide about complaints relating to
unfair labor practices.
Robert E. Darling, "Employee-Management Relations in the Air Force
Logistics Command; The Grievance Process" (unpublished Master's thesis,
Course XV, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967). Edward Gordon
Koepnick, "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service"
(unpublished Master's thesis, Course XV, M. I. T. , 1965). Commander
Chantee Lewis, USN, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor Relations,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (March, 1965), pp. 60-69.
2
Harold S. Roberts, Labor-Management Relations in the Public
Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1968), pp. 704-705.
3Otto Pragan, "Panel Discussion: Is Private Sector Industrial
Relations the Objective in the Federal Service?" Industrial Relations
Research Association , Proceedings of the 1966 Annual Spring Meeting
(May 6-7, 1966), p. 138.

-32-
Mr. Pragan's article is, in my opinion, a well-reasoned and cogent
analysis of the Executive Order effects from the unions' point of view.
That he was largely on target with his criticisms, particularly 2), 4),
and 5) will be evident in a later section.
From the evidence presented in the above paragraphs, although it is
necessarily the briefest of summarizations , I think it can be stated
fairly that the general reaction to the Executive Order was favorable
with much less opposition from the administrators than would have been
expected from the previous history of the attitudes and policies on
federal employee unionization and bilateral negotiations.
What about more objective standards with which to measure the
effect of the Executive Order on the unions? I think a couple of
examples of what has happened to union membership should be sufficient
to demonstrate the Order's impact.
Outside the postal service, however, the growth is
keyed to the new era of collective bargaining. By the
spring of 1963, 15 months after the presidential order,
unions had won exclusive bargaining rights for 94,000
non-postal federal employees. By mid-1965, the
number had grown to 300,000. The latest official
tally was in August, 1966 and the current figures
certainly are higher. But at that time the total had
reached 445,000. Of these, 252,000 were blue collar
wage board workers and 194,000 were classified salaried
employees. *
Bringing the statistics up to date we find that unions are still making
rapid progress in the government. Unions now represent a majority of
David L. Perlman, "Public Employees (sic): An Emerging Force,"
AFL-CIO American Federationist (July, 1967), p. 17.
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the federal workers. Employees in exclusive units totalled 52% of the
workforce in November, 1968 compared with 45% in November, 1967. The
AFGE made large gains over that year and the postal and shipyard unions
stayed on a plateau. Eleven government agencies are now more than 50%
organized, compared with 5 agencies in November of 1967. The statistics
indicate that in those agencies where unionism had traditionally been
strong - Post Office Department and Navy Shipyards - the unions organized
swiftly during the early days of Executive Order 10988 and since may
2have reached the limits of their potential. This may be true or it may
just be a pause in these organizations while the unions develop new
organizing programs.
The judiciary has rendered two significant decisions concerning
10988 since its promulgation. One of these involved the use of the 60X
3
rule in an election case. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal of a Federal Court decision upholding an agency's
use of the rule. The court held that the Order's validity did not
depend on congressional action and said any disagreement over interpreta-
4tion of its implementation should be referred to the President. The
second case was the NFFE suit previously referred to. In this case the






At least 60 percent of the unit employees present and eligible must
participate in a representation election in order for the election to be
considered valid.
L




District of Columbia Circuit Court found the Order to be a proper
exercise of Executive Branch power and indicated controversies should
be resolved within the Executive Branch and not in the courts.
Another viewpoint is expressed by Senator Daniel B. Brewster in the
Congressional Record , April 5, 1966 on pages 7214-7215. His introductory
remarks for his bill (S. 3188) observed that "... A lot of the bloom has
been worn off the idealistic rose...." Senator Brewster was particularly
critical of the role played by the Civil Service Commission, claiming
that it no more served the federal employees than does the National
Association of Manufacturers. The Senator took strong exception to the
effectiveness of Executive Order 10988 and dedicated himself to securing
the passage of legislation which would "... give Federal employees the
same 20th-century rights which workers in private industry have been
enjoying for 30 years."
I think the words of Professor Rehmus of the University of Michigan
comprise an appropriate counterbalance to Senator Brewster's view:
I am not surprised, however, that this millennium has
not been reached in four years. In fact, I would have
been astonished if it had. The present imperfect state
of private sector industrial relationships is at least
30 years old and much maturation is yet to come . Social
institutions do not develop so rapidly, and social
progress does not come so fast. In time, however, I do
expect that labor relations in the Federal service will
"
National Federation of Federal Employees , Civil Action No. 1380-64
(D. C. Cir. 1965).

-35-
come to be more like those in the private sector,
although never wholly like them. 1 [emphasis supplied]
In this section of the paper I have tried to give a representative
sampling of the views of management, labor, and third parties on the
effect of Executive Order 10988. With the exception of Senator Brewster,
the general consensus was that the Order has had a pronounced and
definitely beneficial effect on government labor-management relations.
It is true that the unions along with some third parties such as
Wilson R. Hart, feel that the program does not do enough for the unions.
However, I think it only fair to recall that in all their history the
unions have never been wholly satisfied - either in or out of govern-
ment - nor are they likely to be in the future. I would now like to
address myself to the presently existing situation.
Section 6 - Present Status
President Johnson, in late 1967, appointed a committee to review
the application and the results of Executive Order 10988 and to
2
recommend any necessary changes to the Order. The membership of the
Review Committee was the same as that of the original Task Force, but
with the incumbents of the Johnson Administration replacing those of the
Kennedy Administration.
Charles M. Rehmus , "Panel Discussion: Is Private Sector Industrial
Relations the Objective in the Federal Service?" Industrial Relations
Research Association
, Proceedings of the 1966 Annual Spring Meeting
(May 6-7, 1966), pp. 57-58.
2
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
The White House, September 8, 1967.
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The Review Committee solicited the views of public spokesmen, union
and agency officials and was assisted by a panel of experts from outside
the government. However, unlike the original Task Force, the Review
Committee was unable to agree on the changes to be made. Consequently
the committee was not able to make a report with recommendations to
President Johnson before the change in administrations. An unofficial
draft report was released in January, 1969 for public information by
the former Secretary of Labor, W. Williard Wirtz with these words:
A series of developments (including changes in the
membership of the Committee) precluded either final
agreement on the Draft Report or any transmittal to
the President. This Draft Report is included here
as Attachment B. This document has no official
status. It is set out because it reflects the serious
and responsible contributions of a wide variety of
informed people to a subject of vital national
concern.
In the background portion of the draft report, the Review Committee
concluded that
The benefits from the program have been many. There has
been a marked improvement in the communication between
agencies and their employers. Employees now actively
participate in the determination of the conditions of
their work. This participation has contributed signifi-
cantly to the conduct of public business. The collective
bargaining agreements that have been negotiated have
Draft Report of the President's Review Committee on Employee-
Management Relations in the Federal Service (April, 1968), Attachment
B to the 56th Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor (January, 1969).
2
Department of Labor, "56th Annual Report of the Secretary of
Labor," (Washington, D. C: January, 1969).
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given continuity and stability to the labor-management
relationship.
1
The program, as it exists today, is flourishing. There are now 1,238,748
employees in 1,813 units with exclusive recognition, 1,172 with formal
2
recognition, and 1,031 with informal recognition.
3
The Review Committee made 19 recommendations to the President.
Rather than list all the recommendations, I have chosen to list only
four of them upon which I wish to comment. The four are not necessarily
the most important, but merely those on which I would like to present
4
my views. The four recommendations are quoted below:
A. Central authority for program decisions . A Federal
Labor Relations Panel. A three-member Federal Labor
Relations Panel, consisting of the Secretary of
Labor, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and
the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board
should be established to oversee the entire Federal
Service labor relations program, to make definitive
interpretations and rulings on any provisions of the
Order, to decide major policy issues, to entertain,
at its discretion, appeals from decisions on certain
disputed matters, to review and assist in the
resolution of negotiation impasses and to report to
the President on the state of the program with
recommendations
.
D. Procedures to be adopted in the event of impasses
in negotiations . The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service should extend its services to

















procedures for the resolution of impasses should
be made available, including fact finding on the
merits of a dispute with recommendations forming
the basis of further negotiations, or the
arbitration of impasses or both. The parties to
an impasse should have the right to request the
services of the Federal Labor Relations Panel.
F. Status of supervisors . Supervisors should be
considered part of management. Formal or exclu-
sive recognition should not be granted to mixed
units or to units consisting solely of supervisors.
0. Union security . Agencies and labor organizations
holding exclusive recognition may negotiate provi-
sions for voluntary payroll deduction of dues or
their equivalent revocable only at twelve-month
intervals under specified circumstances. [emphasis
supplied]
First, I do not agree that a need has been shown for a new agency to
administer and interpret the policy. I think the same thing could be
accomplished by realigning some functions of the Civil Service Commission
and the Department' of Labor and assigning the responsibility for
interpreting and administering the program to the Department of Labor.
In the case of impasses or appeals from an agency decision where the
Department of Labor is an interested party, another agency such as the
Civil Service Commission or the NLRB would act in place of Labor. It is
See Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service
,
pp. 242-246 for an excellent discussion of a bill introduced by Senator
Clark which would have limited the Civil Service Commission to surveil-
lance of the merit system and processing employee appeals. The
Commission's executive functions would have been transferred to an
Office of Personnel in the Executive Office of the President. Former
members of the Commission x^ere in favor of the bill. Incumbent Commission
members were opposed. Unions in general were opposed because they were
afraid it would mean a return to the spoils system. Hart points out the
irrationality of that fear when he says, "... no self-respecting union,
even in the absence of the Civil Service Act, would permit that to happen."
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ray opinion that the creation of the Federal Labor Relations Panel would
simply result in more administrative layering and an additional element
of divided authority and responsibility and more wasteful "coordination"
effort.
Hart contends that the Civil Service Commission has always been the
source of executive policy on personnel matters and the Commission has
been subject to very little de facto control by the cabinet or the
President. Four years after the promulgation of Executive Order 10988,
Hart vehemently denounced the Civil Service Commission for emasculating
2
the substance and frustrating the intent of the Order.
It is not likely, in any case, that the unions will be satisfied
very long with a Federal Labor Relations Panel constituted as
recommended by the Review Committee. The unions will continue to push
for an independent agency like the NLRB.
Recommendation D dealt with procedures to be adopted in the event of
impasses in negotiations. My personal opinion is that the extension of
the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to the
federal labor relations program can be very beneficial. The efforts
made in this area so far have been well received by both labor and
government executives. This area of bargaining impasses is an extremely
thorny problem in labor-management relations. Even when an attempt has






Hart, "The Impasse...", pp. 175-189.
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private industry, the efforts have not been successful. The latest
legislative attempt, the Taft-Hartley Act, has not proven to be a
satisfactory solution. The tendency for third party governmental
intervention to stifle true bargaining has been repeatedly demonstrated.
A good example, in an extremely important area, is the atomic energy
industry. Secretary of Labor Mitchell had a committee of experts study
the AEC and they found less and less was settled by bargaining and more
2
and more by reliance on Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel.
The procedures recommended by the Review Committee may work because
of the fact that the government employees do feel a definite obligation
to the public. It remains to be seen, if the recommendations are imple-
mented, whether the recommended procedure will tend to suppress collective
bargaining in the government as it has in private industry. If it is to
work, the frequency of referral to the Federal Labor Relations Panel will
have to be deliberately kept low.
Recommendation F departs, I believe, from one of the basic tenets of
the philosophy of labor-management relations. It forbids supervisors to
be in mixed units and denies exclusive recognition to units of supervisors.
I do think that a line has to be drawn somewhere. I agree that they
should not be in mixed units, but I think prohibiting all supervisor
units from gaining exclusive recognition is going too far the other way.
"Emergency Strikes Might be Redefined in New Legislation," Wall
Street Journal (March 6, 1969).
2
David L. Cole, The Quest for Industrial Peace (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 38.
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I think this line could be drawn at such a level as to make it more
practical. For example, it has been my personal experience that many
of the classified employees exhibit a definite change in outlook when
they make the change from a GS-11 to a GS-12. This may not be true with
all individuals or in the Washington area, and it may be a trickier task
with the ungraded supervisors, but it may offer a reasonable indication
to a compromise solution to the problem of the individual being free to
join an organization and to have it bargain in his behalf. The higher
in the authority hierarchy a supervisor is, the more influence he is
able to exert on matters bearing on his own situation and therefore has
relatively less need of the power of a union to act on his behalf.
That this opinion of mine is not unique can be demonstrated by
quoting Representative Morrison, the vice-chairman of the House Post
Office and Civil Service Committee.
There can be no real conflict between the leaders of our
government agencies and the leaders of the employee
organizations that qualify for recognition. . . . Differ-
ences of opinion can only exist over means; never over
ends. The ultimate interest of both must inevitably be
the same: to make the United States Goverment the best,
the most efficient, and the most honorable in the world.
Representative Morrison has proposed a simple solution to the conflict of
interest problem; he proposes that no employee "be placed in a position
2
where he is bargaining with himself." The Morrison Bill codifies





Executive Order 10988, repeals the Civil Service Commission amendments
and guidelines, and creates a "little NLRB."
Recommendation concerns union security and involves the unresolv-
able conflict of individual freedom (not to join a union) and group
participation and effectiveness (a financially stable union). The Civil
Service System's very reason for being is to insure availability of jobs
and advancement based, as nearly as possible, solely on ability and
qualifications. Any form of union security abridges that purpose to
some extent. I believe that the employees, acting collectively, and
bargaining with the employer should be able to agree on some form of
union security. In view of the conflicting aims of the Civil Service
System and the unions, it would appear to me that a reasonable approach
would be some form of agency shop. One stumbling point in agency shop
considerations has always been the amount of the "fee" and what it
should include. Why not let the unions and the non-union members
bargain the fee question with management as a directly concerned third
party? Recommendation 0, particularly with the wording "dues or their
equivalent," appears to be the initial step in authorizing negotiations
for an agency shop. I am positive, however, that the unions will continue
to push for stronger union security measures.
The new Republican Administration of President Nixon has not yet
taken a stand on the recommendations made by the Review Committee. The




In our view, one of the reasons for the substantial
success of E. 0. 10988 was its accommodation to the
existing varied pattern of union-agency relationships
throughout the Government, while making it possible
for those relationships to evolve and strengthen as
they have done.
It will be interesting to see if traditional Republican position on
labor-management relations will be altered, as it has in other policy
areas, by the pressures and realities of an incumbent administration.
Recommendations were due to be forwarded to President Nixon sometime
in June or July of 1969.
The unions seem to be gaining strength in their drive to achieve
statutory recognition. In a survey, 210 Senators and Representatives
indicated they favored enactment of a statutory labor relations code for
2
government employees. In the current session of Congress, no fewer than
eight bills to improve employee-management relations in the postal
3
service have already been introduced.
Section 7 - Possible Future Policy
In establishing my own philosophical position on labor relations,
I find myself in complete agreement with the Review Committee when they
state:
Statement of Wilfred V. Gill, Director, Office of Labor-Management
Relations, U. S. Civil Service Commission before the House Subcommittee
on Postal Operations, April 25, 1969, pp. 1-2.
2Government Employee Relations Report , No. 297 (May 19, 1969), p. A9,
3
Ibid. , No. 298 (May 26, 1969), pp. A7-A8.
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It is generally recognized that agreements voluntarily
arrived at through a free collective bargaining system
are the hallmark of the industrial democracy enjoyed
in this country
.
One of the most persistent criticisms of this system of industrial
democracy is that it causes continuous strife. In the first place, it
is generally agreed by most students of industrial relations that the
amount of strife, as measured by man-days lost as a percentage of the
total man days available, is really rather small in the United States.
Even if this were not true, is an absolute absence of strife and conflict
(other than violence) to be our ultimate goal? I, for one, do not think
it should be.
The contemporary argument over the place of strife and conflict in
our society is being waged daily in the news media. In all the discussion
about unrest on our university campuses, one would have to dig long and
hard to find anyone who condemns the unrest unequivocally. The roll call
of those who feel the strife and conflict on our campuses is basically a
guide to desirable change would be a veritable "who's who" of government,
industry, the clergy, and the academic worlds. They argue about the
tactics and the means, but they are for many of the changes and reforms.
Why should it be any different in industrial relations?
My purpose in digressing momentarily was to set the stage for the
discussion of the removal of some of the final barriers separating the
situation of the government and the private workers - those of wages and





standard" in its policy for industrial relations. I think, however, that
the government can go further.
Take the area of wage and salary negotiations. Congress directly
controls the salary levels of the classified employees and has, on
occasion, rebuked the Executive Branch for using "grade escalation" to
manipulate the salaries of the classified workers. The wages of non-
classified workers are set in accordance with the "area prevailing wage"
policy. The setting of budgets for individual government installations
is still an inexact process and there is some room for maneuver within a
given budget. It might be possible, although it is pretty far-fetched,
to negotiate wages and salaries within relatively fixed activity budget
allocations. I don't think this idea is very practical, however, because
Congress will not give up their power over classified salary levels and
the unions would not be willing to accept the consequences of the trade-
offs among wages, salaries, number of jobs, amount of required materials,
etc. which would result from such an approach. The TVA has had good
success with the "area prevailing wage" concept applied to classified
workers as well as blue collar workers and that is another possibility
if Congress would allow it.
The other area, involving the right to strike, is a most sensitive
one for the unions. The prohibition on striking has led the government
employee unions to become perhaps the most skilled lobbying groups known
in our government. This skilled application of political technique has
become a most potent alternative to the strike.
The union spokesmen have long held that "the outright prohibition
of the right to strike by public employees is a denial of a fundamental

-46-
and inherent right." This policy of prohibiting strikes by public
employees has a long and consistent history. It was early and most
succinctly enunciated by Calvin Coolidge when he was Govenor of
Massachusetts and condemned the Boston policemen's strike thusly:
"There is no right to strike against the public safety of anybody,
2
anywhere, at any time." This philosophy, pertaining to policemen, has
been extended to government employment in general and is embodied in
present legislation in Public Law 330 (69 Stat. 624) which makes striking
against the federal government a felony. However,
... the more militant unions such as the State, County,
and Municipal Employees and the Teachers assert the
right to strike and not infrequently practice it.
... In public employment, on the other hand, unions
and even associations, which in principle reject the
strike weapon, have found that it often brings quick
and rewarding results. Furthermore, they have learned
that risks are not great, despite the severe penalties
which may legally be imposed on strikers.
This explains, I think, why despite the public proclamations of
union officials (such as George Meany in an earlier part of this paper)
Arnold S. Zander, AFSCME, "A Union View of Collective Bargaining
in the Public Service," Public Administration Review , Vol. XXII, No. 1
(Winter, 1962), p. 8.
2
'"Union Organization and Activities of Public Employees," American









and constitutions to comply with legal requirements, true union goals
are more truthfully contained in this statement of Witte's:
While organized labor regards the strike as a measure
of last resort, to be used only when all other methods
fail, it has always been uncompromisingly opposed to
any restriction of the right to strike. Unions regard
striking as a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, particularly by the thirteenth amendment,
which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.
^
Even employees who are very definitely directly connected with the
public safety, the firefighters and the policemen, are joining unions in
droves and some of them, notably the firefighters, have already deleted
2
no-strike clauses from their constitutions. As another example of how
seriously the unions intend to pursue their aims in the public employee
arena, consider the proposal by the National Education Association for
a "Federal law to require school boards to bargain with unions and give
3
teachers the right to strike." Also consider the fact that the "State,
County and Municipal Employees Union is expected to call soon for similar
legislation covering all state and local government employees."
The points made in the above discussion are intended to emphasize the
fact that unionists regard the right to strike as a fundamental liberty
Edwin F. Witte, Government in Labor Disputes (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1932), p. 17.
2
" Card-Carrying Police?" Newsweek (March 3, 1969), p. 66.
3
"Pub lie-Employee Unions Start Pushing for Federally Backed Bargain-





and are willing to renounce it only as a result of a collective
bargaining agreement. This means two things. First, that one should
not take too seriously the protestations of public employee unions that
they do not assert the right to strike. They regard adoption of a no-
strike clause or position as one of expediency and it is designed to
allay governmental and public opposition to unions and to avoid alienat-
ing the prospective members who might be put off by strike advocacy.
Second, the legitimate aspect of their feelings about their right to
strike should not be dismissed lightly.
Consideration should be given to the question of giving the
government employees the right to strike. This does not mean that I
endorse the unqualified right of all federal government employees to
strike. However, the idea that all strikes in the government are strikes
which severely threaten the public health and safety is as misconceived
as the idea that all strikes in a particular industry seriously threaten
the public health and safety. Many authorities
... challenge the traditional assumption that the
consequences of strikes on the part of public
employees are necessarily more detrimental to public
welfare than a stoppage in privately managed under-
takings because of the critical nature of the
services. They argue that the public is often more
dependent upon such private utilities as rail and
road transportation, coal mines, telecommunications,
garbage disposal, and the packing of spring vegetables
than upon the services of such categories of public





employees as filing clerks, statisticians, report
writers, and others whose activities are far less
vital. 1
Another authority concludes that "The criterion of distinction is
therefore the consequences of a strike upon the public interest, not the
2
status of the employer."
I think it is a mistake to adhere to a policy which tries to decide
in advance that strikes in broad categories of employment will not be
allowed. The damage to the public in a strike is too much a function of
too many circumstances to be arbitrarily and rigidly determined in
advance - particularly by legislation. A good case can be made for
allowing strikes by government workers, at least in many segments of
government employment. Canada has already begun to experiment with
3legally allowing some government workers to strike. This experiment
will be discussed more fully in the next section dealing with other
countries' experiences.
This concludes my discussion of the U. S. Government's policy on
federal employee-management relations. I have discussed how we got
where we are at the present time, the present policy, and what the
future official administration position is likely to be. I have also
David Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 9. At least 700 of the
strikes were by federal employees. Strikes by federal government
employees since the end of WWII have been practically nonexistent.
2
Leonard D. White, "Strikes in the Public Service," Public
Personnel Review
, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January, 1949), pp. 5-6.
George Bain, "Prime Minister Trudeau on Strikes," Canadian Labour ,
Vol. 13, No. 9 (September, 1968), p. 11.
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included my own views on certain aspects of the policy and what I think
are two logical and equitable extensions of that policy and ones which
I think the unions will pursue vigorously in the future. This part of
the paper has traced the evolution of government policy on federal
employee-management relations from a concept of complete and absolute
negativeness to an attempt to achieve equality of treatment for govern-
ment workers with those in private industry. While admittedly it has
not always done so willingly, the government has nevertheless moved a
long way philosophically in a short time.
In the next section I shall turn to a discussion of the experiences
of other countries and other U. S. Government agencies to assess the
possible applicability of that experience to U. S. policy.
Section 8 - U. S. Agencies and Other Countries
The portion of this paper dealing with other U. S. Agencies will
be short. The Tennessee Valley Authority, a government corporation
not subject to the civil service regulations, and the Department of the
Interior, which is subject to all the civil service and other regulations,
are both generally acknowledged to have superior and successful employee-
management relations policies. Is there some secret to be discovered in
their policies which would greatly benefit other agencies?
Interest in the TVA centers primarily on the alternative to the
strike and the negotiations for wages and salaries. The law which
established the TVA specified that wages were to be determined by using
the prevailing area wage principle. The law further specified that
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In the determination of such prevailing rate or rates,
due regard shall be given to those rates which have
been secured through collective agreement by repre-
sentatives of employers and employees.
1
The fact is that the TVA probably gives more consideration to union rates
in an area than do the Defense Department agencies for example. Natu-
rally this makes the unions happier than does a limited consideration of
union wage rates in an area.
A former personnel official of the TVA said
The Council (of labor unions), in fact, protests that
the prevailing rate formula is not a good one for a
progressive government employer, maintaining that the
government should set an example by providing a higher
standard of. living for its workers than does private
industry.
Despite this union rhetoric, the unions and TVA mutually agreed to extend
this principle to the salaried workers. Crispo, in comparing the TVA
and the Ontario-Hydro Project, concluded that the prevailing wage
principle is the best method for salary and wage determination for
3
public employees devised to date. He also stated that the unions
probably accept the policy because it is the best possibility they can
United States Congress, The Tennessee Valley Authority Act , Public
Law 17, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. , 1933, as amended to August 30, 1954,
Section 3.
2
Harry L. Case, Personnel Policy in a Public Agency - The TVA
Experience (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 88.
3
John Herbert G. Crispo, "Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service, TVA-Ontario Hydro" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Course XIV,
M. I. T., 1960), pp. 310-312.
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hope for considering economics, public interest, and harmony in
bargaining.
With regard to an alternative to use of the strike, Crispo con-
cluded that
This is the essential achievement of union and manage-
ment in T.V.A. ; the creation of an effective collective
bargaining relationship in the absence of the right to
strike. [emphasis supplied]
However, I was unable to find in any of the references any discussion of
how the TVA handled or would handle bargaining impasses. Even the
following quotation of Lewis J. Van Mol, General Manager of TVA in 1966,
uses the term "impasses" but still seems to deal with existing agreements.
For the impasse that may occur, our agreements provide
for mediation. If mediation fails, there is a provi-
sion for voluntary arbitration.-* [emphasis supplied]
The term "mediation" is most commonly used in connection with bargaining
impasses so it is not clear here whether TVA uses voluntary arbitration
only for grievances or for both grievances and bargaining impasses.
On the other hand, it Is well established that the TVA procedures
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In the first thirteen years of operation under these
collective agreements, only two grievances were taken
to arbitration.
*
Turning now to the Department of the Interior we find that they
inaugurated their progressive policies in 1948 and they regard the
program as completely successful. Speaking on behalf of the Secretary
of the Interior, Newell B. Terry, the Director of Personnel, said:
We not only have no objection in those areas in which
we use it [collective bargaining with employees], sir,
but we encourage it and believe that it contributes to
better management and employee relationships.
The Department of the Interior program is noteworthy because it
... proves that it is feasible for a major governmental
department (as opposed to a governmental corporation
such as TVA or an independent agency with a highly
specialized industrial type function such as GPO) to
engage in bona-fide collective bargaining.-*
The Department of the Interior negotiates two types of agreements.
First is the "Basic Agreement" which contains statements of the
principles and policies to govern the relationship of the Department and
the unions. This agreement must be approved by the Office of the
Secretary before becoming effective. Supplementary agreements then
Case, p. 68.
2
Hearings on H. R. 6 before the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. , 1958, p. 275.
3
Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service , p. 89.
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... deal with working rules, conditions of employment,
wage rates, etc. and are negotiated and signed by the
field official who has jurisdiction over the employees
in the bargaining unit involved. No approval of the
Secretary's office is required for the supplementary
agreements
.
Another important departure from the usual practice is Interior's
policy with regard to supervisor participation in union activities.
Prior to Executive Order 10988, Interior's regulations essentially left
it up to the individual supervisors as to whether or not they might have
2
a conflict of interest.
On the key item of wages, the Department of the Interior also relies
on the prevailing wage principle in setting wage rates. There is full
participation by the unions in all the steps of setting the wage rates
3based on the area prevailing wage scales.
The Department and the employee unions use a three man arbitration
board for contract impasses as well as grievances in both the blue collar
and classified services. They follow the usual practice of each choosing
one arbitrator and then those two pick a third to form the panel. The
recommendations of the arbitration panel, particularly in the case of
bargaining impasses, must go to the Secretary for final approval. This
complies with the requirement for the executive to have complete and
Newell B. Terry, "Collective Bargaining in the U. S. Department of










final authority. As practiced by the Department of the Interior,
however, it is strictly a formality and the unions accept it as such.
From this discussion on the TVA and the Department of the Interior,
both of which are well regarded by employee unions, it can be seen that
from a technical standpoint their employee-management relations programs
are not too radically different from that of Executive Order 10988.
What is it then, which accounts for the difference in the unions' per-
ceptions of these two agencies and the rest of the government agencies?
It is my personal opinion that the difference lies in the fact that
for many years - TVA from its inception and Interior from 1948 - these
two agencies have taken a definitely positive approach to their dealings
with the unions. They have dealt with them as equals and have always
given the unions credit for performing a useful and positive function in
the management of the agencies. In other words, it is merely a matter of
attitudes and experience. It indicates to me that perhaps the government
needs to change its attitude from "strict neutrality as to union or no
union" to one of a positive attitude on unionism and strict neutrality
as to which union if and when the employees decide they wish to be
represented by a union.
I would now like to address a few remarks to the experience of other
countries. Of the highly industrialized countries, Russia and her
satellite countries and Japan have social systems which are so different
from that of the U. S. that it is not likely their processes of industrial
relations would be accepted in the U. S. in the near future.
In England, in contrast to the United States, the percentage of
government workers organized has been higher than the national average
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for highly organized private industry. These government unions have not
always conformed to the stereotype of the moderate union; they have often
2
taken militant action. As in the U. S. , the problem of collective
bargaining in the absence of the right to strike is a troublesome
question.
A trade union that cannot strike is like a muzzled
dog - however fierce its noises, no one is really
afraid. 3
The pay for the Civil Service is now set in accordance with recommenda-
tions of the Priestly Commission. The approach is similar to the pre-
vailing wage system for blue collar workers in the U. S. Government. It
is administered by the Civil Service Pay Research Unit composed of
4
representatives of management and the employees.
In dealing with impasses which could lead to strikes, the experi-
ences of the British civil service under the Civil Service National
Whitley Council Arbitration Agreement of 1925 suggests that the arbitration
process need not be excessively rigid and that it can be adapted to
satisfy employee claims while remaining consistent with the constitu-
tional responsibility of the government. From the employer's side at
Adolf Fox Sturmthal, ed. , White-Collar Trade Unions (Urbana,
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least, the arbitration awards are binding:
But it was no use for the Treasury to refuse to grant
increases to civil servants if the Civil Service
Arbitration Tribunal could reverse their decision. . .
.
However, the Labor Party has recently proposed that drastic legislative
steps be taken to curb the excesses of British unions. This is due more
to the excessive fragmentation with each union representing only its own
members and the consequent inability to control wildcat strikes than it
is to a failure of the arbitration procedures.
France is also beset by a system that fragments union organization
to an extreme. "Nowhere can one find an enterprise, a plant, a govern-
ment department, or even an office where one union represents all the
2
members of the unit." This splintering of the groups is encouraged and
protected by law. This, combined with the peculiar bargaining process,
renders the civil service unions "powerful only as a conservative and
negative way. ... but they have little success in realizing advances
3
and taking advantage of the opportunities of an economy in expansion."
Because of these factors, there does not appear to be anything of benefit
to U. S. Government policy in the French experience.
In Sweden, the white-collar workers have traditionally been highly















government workers. Collective bargaining rights were extended to the
central government workers in 1937 by decree. To conduct collective
bargaining, a special board consisting of representatives of unions of
central government employees, negotiates with the Civil Service
Minister - a cabinet post created for this purpose - on salaries and
other terms of employment. Prior to 1966 the government workers did not
have equal status with those in private industry. In 1966, however, the
central and local government workers were given full legal standing in
2
the field of collective bargaining, including the right to strike. The
employer may make decisions concerning salaries, etc., and then inform
the unions before they become final and early enough for unions to propose
negotiations. The agreement is not legally binding on the government.
The provisions of the agreement must be embodied in a bill and presented
to parliament for enactment to become valid. The parliament has never
3
failed to pass the agreements without change.
Sweden's experience could be useful in the U. S. , but the bargaining
would have to be decentralized in the U. S. because of the vast difference
in size of the Swedish and American Governments. American unions
probably would not have the patience to negotiate an agreement and then
wait several months for the U. S. Congress to decide whether to accept












that it is extremely doubtful that Congress would even consider such a
system.
Australia has 63 unions registered with the federal arbitration
tribunal which are classed as white-collar. Of these 63, 29 are in
private industry and 34 are in federal or state governments. These 29
unions belong to the High Council of Commonwealth Public Service
Organization which was formed in 1920 to coordinate bargaining with the
2
Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrators. Compulsory arbitration was
3introduced in the 1890' s as the method of settling bargaining impasses.
Government workers are prohibited from striking. A most succinct state-
ment on the Australian experience with outlawing strikes certainly holds
a lesson for other countries:
Despite these efforts to outlaw strikes, and the steps
taken at times to break strikes by the use of the army,
the general attitude of the community has been tolerant
of illegal strikes. As the president of the Queensland
Industrial Court said in 1924: "The difficulty of
enforcing penalties against strikes is partly political,
partly practical. The punishment of large numbers of
strikers by prosecution is in practice a difficult
matter. The enforcement of the penalties is usually
opposed by one or other political party. In practice
the deterrent against strikes is the recognition of the
fact that since arbitration has been on the whole
beneficial to the unions, deprivation of access to the
















Australia's experience with compulsory arbitration and the outlawing of
strikes has not been a very successful one and is a powerful argument
against the use of compulsory arbitration in the U. S. A former
Secretary of Labor, in speaking on the subject of compulsory arbitration,
warned against
... setting up procedures which will establish
certainty in an area, the area of collective bargain-
ing, part of the strength of which has always been
that it does not provide a complete degree of
certainty.
Germany, in contrast to the U. S. , has no requirement for mandatory
collective bargaining. There the procedural phases of bargaining are not
regulated as they are in the U. S. However, in the U. S. substance is
left to the bargaining parties while in Germany the substance is often
3
regulated by law. It is rare that there is any local plant bargaining
in Germany. Whereas in the United States there is a system of day to day
"industrial jurisprudence" for enforcement of the agreement, in Germany
4
they look to the works council and labor courts for enforcement. As a
result of the different concepts and approaches in the U. S. and Germany,
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is a "brawling-vigorous" part of the society. There is some evidence
which indicates that the German unions have shed some of their
complacency subsequent to 1957. "Bitter metalworkers' dispute presages
tougher relations between labor and management. Bonn considers compul-
2
sory arbitration to ward off strikes and lockouts." Also from 1958 to
1968 the average hourly wage for German men in the non-agricultural
sectors increased by 100 percent, while in the U. S. during the same
3
period the increase was roughly 46 percent. The reader will recall my
comment about the role of strife in our industrial relations system in
an earlier section of this paper and note the corroboration by another
expert observer. Sturmthal says that
In fact, this procedure [collective bargaining in
Germany] may be more correctly described as govern-
ment mediation combined with a good deal of govern-
ment pressure in favor of acceptance of government
sponsored terms.
He concludes, in summing up his survey of collective bargaining in other
countries , that
In other words, evolution does not seem to lead from
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evolving at present in the countries considered is a
system in which three partners - employer, union,
government - operate, with changing relationships of
strength among them.
This conclusion is basically in agreement with my own thinking about the
direction which collective bargaining with public employees is likely to
take in the United States. In view of the legislative pressures again
building up in Congress, I do think the government unions stand a good
chance of obtaining the statutory recognition they have longed for.
Canada, because of recent changes in legislation, is a somewhat
different matter. Beginning with the Glassco Commission Report, released
in the Fall of 1962, progress toward complete collective bargaining in
the civil service has developed rapidly in Canada. It stated that the
civil service needed reorganization and proposed that the Civil Service
Commission be limited entirely to recruiting and technical aspects of the
2
civil service system. Doesn't that sound a lot like what the Clark Bill
proposed in the United States? Next came the Heeney Report in 1965.
The Report proposed a method of collective bargaining for the civil
service which provided for binding arbitration to settle disputes and
recommended that unions be granted the right to strike. Based on the
Glassco and Heeney reports, the Canadian Government on March 13, 1967
passed the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSR Act). This law, for
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bargaining rights to federal civil service as are enjoyed by employees
in private enterprise.
The Act provides two separate and distinct processes for the
settlement of disputes. The certified bargaining agent can choose,
prior to bargaining, either binding arbitration or referral to a
conciliation board. This latter selection allows a strike if no agree-
ment can be reached. The PSSR Act permits strikes by all employees
except those who perform duties essential to the safety and security of
the public. Therefore, if the conciliation board option is chosen, then
management must submit a list of "designated employees" who will remain
2
on the job if bargaining ends in a strike. The PSSR Board will mediate
on any disputes concerning the list of "designated employees."
What has been Canada's experience under this new law so far?
C. A. Edwards, president of the Public Service Alliance of Canada
stated:
I want to state unequivocally that, in my opinion, it
is a good law designed primarily for employees in our
federal government. This does not mean I agree with
every clause, or that we did not seek changes prior
to passage, nor would we not seek changes now. We did
and we would, but in general terms, the law has provided
a good system of collective bargaining for public
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Edward E. Herman, Professor of Economics at the University of Cincinnati,
noted that of 64 units which have so far negotiated under the new law,
56 chose the arbitration option and that contrary to the fears of many,
all agreements so far have been voluntarily settled short of the
terminal point. There was no indication during the San Francisco
2
conference that the "designated employees" provision had caused any
real problems so far.
This Canadian law, as modified by experience may very definitely
have application in the United States as the government employee unions
3
launch attacks on the no- strike laws.
In this part of the thesis I have touched on the experience of two
government agencies with superior labor-management relations programs,
and looked - in very gross terms - at the systems of some other
countries for possible applicability in the United States. In the next
part, I turn to the second main objective of the thesis - to discuss the
congruity of the government policy on labor-management relations and
how the Civil Engineer Corps is likely to be affected by the union




A conference of public officials, attorneys, and union representa-
tives from the U. S. and Canada to discuss collective bargaining by
public employees. Held in San Francisco the week of January 20, 1969.
Government Employee Relations Report , No. 297 (May 19, 1969), p. 2.
"NALC President James H. Rademacher also announced that legal assaults
on federal no-strike oath, mandated by 1968 convention, will be launched
in federal court within six weeks."
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Section 9 - Unionization and the Civil Engineer Corps
The Civil Engineer Corps of the United States Navy performs
functions in support of the Navy in the following areas: shore facili-
ties planning, design, construction, and maintenance; vehicular
transportation; the operation of utilities; and contingency planning
and combat construction in the Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees).
Navy facilities have a $24 billion replacement value, an annual
capital investment program requiring approximately $1 billion and annual
maintenance costs of approximately $1/2 billion. To perform the
assigned support tasks of the above magnitudes, the CEC has 1957
2
billets. Of those, 388 are Seabee billets leaving 1569 officers to
manage the entire program except the Seabees. Assuming that all 559
staff billets are purely military, that leaves 1010 billets in contract
administration and public works. In contract administration, the CEC
Officer is almost always dealing with unionized contractors and in
public works the entire workforce is civilian and usually highly organized.
Thus it is certain that a Civil Engineer Corps Officer will manage a
unionized workforce if he remains in the Navy for more than one or two
duty assignments. This, I feel, is one of the reasons why Civil
Engineer Corps Officers should have some background and training in
labor-management relations.
Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, A
Study of Civil Engineer Corps Career Development, Education and Training ,









Washington attorney David Barr has written that most
federal personnel administrators are totally unfamiliar
with labor law and, therefore, "strongly suspect the
motives of those who would impose upon them a set of
principles which had been formulated without their
participation." They feel, he adds, that "the intrusion
of 'established' doctrine would necessarily lessen their
scope of power." To complete the circle, they argue,
according to Barr, that "the Federal service is distinctly
different from the private sector.... The 'public
service' concept offers the attractive implication that
greater resistance to 'outside' interference in the
affairs of management is justified than in the private
sector. "l
The federal employees unions have often expressed this sentiment, particu-
larly with regard to the Defense Department and what the unions see as
its authoritarian ways. This lack of familiarity with labor law, its
evolution in the U. S. , and its attitudinal and philosophical implica-
tions, is a second reason why I think Civil Engineer Corps Officers
should be more knowledgeable in this area.
The third compelling reason, as I see it, for CEC Officers to have
knowledge in labor-management relations is one I alluded to in an earlier
section of this thesis - that is, the increasing contentiousness of our
society. This increasing contentiousness is everywhere, in the black-
white relationship, in the active questioning and resistance to present
national policies, and of more direct concern to the present subject, the
relatively new developments in the labor relations field. That these new
developments have a direct pertinence to the Civil Engineer Corps can be
easily shown.
•Klart, "The Impasse..." p. 181 citing David Barr, "E. 0. 10988; An
Experiment in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,"
Georgetown Law Journal , Vol. '52 (Winter, 1964), pp. 420-454.
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First, and potentially the most critical, is the increasing mili-
tancy of professional personnel such as firemen, policemen, teachers,
nurses, and engineers.
The 1968 American Society of Civil Engineers Employment Conditions
Survey may have signalled the beginning of a turbulent period for the
civil engineering profession. "Frequent reference is made to the
effective influence of the trade unions on behalf of skilled and un-
skilled blue collar workers. Annual wages of $17,000-$20,000 being paid
2
in the skilled construction crafts are cited with much bitterness."
The majority of the members still consider themselves to be professionals
and are resistive to the trade union approach. This should not lead to
complacency, however, because the younger members may, as they are doing
in a multitude of other areas, demand and get radical change. The
"trade union tag" will not put them off as it does the older practi-
tioners.
That this is not idle speculation is readily evident from the
following excerpt from Civil Engineering ;
If other avenues of employee-employer communication fail,
engineers in public practice may be justified in turning
to a union.
Engineers in public practice are properly concerned today
with the growth in unionism among public employees, and
with the increasing militancy of the unions in promoting
their economic demands by means of strikes. These
"'""The 1968 ASCE Employment Conditions Survey," Civil Engineering
(September, 1968), pp. 48-51.
2
"ASCE Responsibility for the Economic Welfare of Its Members,"
Civil Engineering (April, 1969), p. 35.
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engineers wonder whether they are witnessing an
inevitable shape of things to come for themselves
when they see teachers, who have always claimed to
be professionals, flocking into unions and joining
in strikes - even strikes that violate court
injunctions.^
As a way to bring this particular aspect closer to home for the CEC
Officer, consider this recent development:
Society of Professional Naval Engineers, affiliate of
National Society's Professional Engineers in Govern-
ment Section, petitions for exclusive recognition as
only way to split 215 professionals out of mixed
American Federation of Technical Engineers unit at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
I am sure that all CEC Officers and civilian management personnel
can readily appreciate the possible impact of the "trade union" approach
by professionals - engineers, lawyers, accountants, personnel managers,
etc. - on the execution of the mission of the Civil Engineer Corps.
This possibility, as critical as it is, is no more crucial than
what is happening in the blue-collar area.
A proposed three-year contract between the striking
Carpenters Union and building contractors will be
submitted to union membership tomorrow for ratification.
Terms granting 10,000 carpenters a $2.85 cent-an-hour
wage package boose - from $5.95 to $8.80 - over the
period were hammered out early yesterday.
"l^aldo G. Bowman, "Engineers in Public Practice Face the Union
Problem," Civil Engineering (April, 1969), p. 49.
2
Government Employee Relations Report , No. 281 (January 27, 1969),
p. 2.
o
Charles Leveroni, "$114 Pay Hike for Carpenters," Boston Herald
Traveler (Wednesday, July 11, 1969), p. 1.
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It requires no great imagination to see what effect an annual salary of
$17,600 plus a fully paid two-week vacation in the private sector will
have on the costs of operating and maintaining the Navy facilities
because of the "area prevailing rate" method of wage determination used
by the federal government. From experience, we know that most of the
funds to pay for the increases which will surely come will be obtained
by reducing personnel and materials to pay for the higher pay scales.
This means that the quality of maintenance of the shore establishment
facilities will tend to slip once again. One can also foresee what
effect this may have on our professional employees and the possible
effect it may have on the morale and retention capabilities of the Civil
Engineer Officer Corps.
My primary purpose here, however, is not to discuss the economics or
the Tightness of the course of events, but rather to use the examples as
levers for ray hypothesis that the time has come when the Civil Engineer
Corps Officer should have some background in labor-management relations.
1 feel it is a necessary pre-requisite if the CEC Officer is to continue
to efficiently perform his function as an "engineer-manager."
As a check on the viability of my hypothesis, I sent a questionnaire
to various Navy activities covering all areas of the United States and
encompassing shipyards, public works centers, naval stations, air stations,
ammunition depots, supply centers and naval bases. The questionnaire was
intended primarily to find out if other Navy Officers and civilians





involved in the management of civilian personnel felt that Navy Officers
should have some formal training in labor-management relations. The
questionnaire was sent to three groups of managers at the activities;
line officers in command, CEC Officers attached to the activity as PWO,
staff, or as C. 0. at public works centers, and civilian industrial
relations officers. This was done to ascertain whether or not there
were different views among these three groups.
Fifty individual questionnaires were sent out and replies were
received from 42 individuals, 17 of them civilians and 25 military. The
questionnaire, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 1, consisted of
12 questions. The first four were intended to establish the extent of
union organization at the activities surveyed and to determine if train-
ing in labor-management relations for supervisors had been provided.
Every activity had an exclusive agreement, either in force, or in pro-
cess of being approved by a higher authority. Every activity had
accomplished or was accomplishing a training program for supervisors.
The training ranged from simple lectures on the negotiated agreement
to seminar type sessions with members of the negotiating team from both
labor and management participating as panel members. The intensity of
training ranged from single sessions of about two hours to several hours
of thorough examination and discussion of the application of the
negotiated agreement. The most cogent statement of the important role
of training in the application and operation of a labor-management agree-
ment was contained in a forwarding letter accompanying one of the
returned questionnaires. The letter was written by the Executive Officer
at one of the Navy's Public Works Centers.
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As I touched on previously, training in the scope,
meaning, extent, interpretation of the previous
agreement (sweetheart or not) was not sufficient.
While many of the grievances generated were not
valid, the union did put management's feet to the
fire on several occasions for its failures to live
up to its part of the agreement. More first and
second level supervisor training should have been
done. While this might not have fended off the
situation we are now in the midst of, it might have
lessened its impact.
The remaining eight questions were intended to find out to what
extent Navy Officers were involved in labor-management relations and what
the future holds in the opinions of both the civilians and the military
officers.
Question five established that of the 17 civilians, 10 were involved
to a "great degree," 6 to a "moderate degree," and 1 to a "small degree."
For the 25 Navy Officers the answers were 15 to a "great degree," and 10
to a "moderate degree." The significant thing about the answers is that
they establish the fact that the Navy Officers are as directly involved
in labor-management relations as their civilian industrial relations
officers. This is not the usual case with top management, and though
the evaluations are extremely subjective, I think the implication for
the Civil Engineer Corps Officer is clear.
Question six was intended to gauge roughly the present level of
formal training in the labor-relations field. Of the 25 officer replies,
only six officers had had any college courses in labor relations. Most
of their training had been in Navy training courses, seminars, and
workshops. The level of formal training among the 17 civilians was
higher, with nine of the 17 having had college courses. This finding
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was not unexpected since the civilians perform the role of professional
personnel specialists.
Question seven concerned the future importance of labor-management
relations in the federal government. Here, the opinions were almost
unanimous. All 17 of the civilians and 23 of the 25 officers felt that
the subject would be more important in the future. Coupled with this
opinion was the virtually unanimous reply to question eight's query as
to the future degree of militancy of the government unions. All 25
officers and 16 of the 17 civilians felt that the unions would definitely
be more militant in the future. Again, the implications for the CEC
Officer are quite clear.
Questions nine and ten dealt with the question of strikes by
federal employees. In replying to question nine, 21 of 25 of the Officers
felt that the unions would advocate the right to strike for federal
workers. Of the civilians, 15 felt the same way. Question ten asked
the respondents if they thought the federal employees should have the
right to strike. Twelve of the 17 civilians said "not at all" and 5 said
"in some agencies and departments." Of the Officers, 20 said "not at
all," three said "in some departments and agencies" and two indicated
"in the Defense Department agencies." There are two significant features
to these answers. One is that the civilians are only about 10% more
liberal than the military on this question. This is contrary to my own
expectation that they would have been much more liberal than the
military. The second, and most important feature, is the head-on
collision indicated by the answers to questions seven, eight, nine and
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ten. The future need of more expertise in the labor-management relations
on the part of both civilian personnel specialists and the Civil
Engineer Corps Officer is, I believe, incontrovertible.
Questions eleven and twelve were designed to elicit a subjective
evaluation of the adequacy of the individual's training in labor-
management relations and an expression of opinion as to whether or not
Navy Officers should have some formal training in college in labor-
management relations. Fifty-two percent of the military and fifty-nine
percent of the civilians felt that their training had been sufficient.
That still leaves a sizable portion in each category who think their
training was not sufficient. All 17 of the civilians and 20 out of 25
of the military thought Navy Officers should have some formal training
in college in employee-management relations.
In my opinion, the questionnaire replies quite adequately substan-
tiate my hypothesis that the criticality of labor-management relations
as an element in the professional skills of the Civil Engineer Corps
Officer will increase in the future and the corollary necessity for some
college training in this field will also increase.
Section 10 - Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
In writing this thesis, I started with the hypothesis that in the
future the area of labor-management relations in the government may
very well be the most volatile in the continuing evolution of the labor
movement in the United States. This hypothesis was then narrowed to the
federal government arena and projected by implication to the professional
training of the Civil Engineer Corps Officer.
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As my means of investigating the validity of my hypothesis, I chose
to trace the evolution of the union movement in the federal government
up to the present time and then, by means of a questionnaire, to project
a reasonable conception of the part labor-management relations will play
in the future of the Civil Engineer Corps "Engineer-Manager."
Necessarily, if I were not to write a book, I have had to resort to
a great deal of subjective editing. I have not attempted to discuss the
details of labor-management relations in the federal government, nor
even in the Department of the Navy since the advent of Executive Order
10988. I have not dealt with the Navy's experience with the initial
unit determination arbitration decisions, with an analysis of agreements
negotiated, or with an analysis of the experience of Navy activities with
the federal employee-management cooperation policy because that was not
my purpose.
My purpose was to summarize the development of the federal govern-
ment's policy on labor relations with its own employees, to catch a
glimpse of some of the union and management attitudes which influenced
and will influence that policy so that the reader could develop a "feel"
for this element in the management of the government workforce. As a
part of that purpose I attempted to show the direct relevance of labor-
management relations to the career of the Civil Engineer Corps Officer.
I think it is clear that after a late start in 1962 with Executive
Order 10988, the national policy on federal employee unionization has
undergone a rapid liberalization and that the trend is likely to
continue. It is also clear from the present legal status, particularly
with regard to the right to strike, and the positions of union leaders
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and management explored in this thesis, that the future years will not be
smooth ones. It will be to any manager's future benefit to be as
knowledgeable as possible in the field of labor-management relations.
The federal personnel manager, including the Navy Civil Engineer
Corps Officer, should not make the mistake of thinking that collective
bargaining is a one-sided affair with the unions reaping all the benefits.
Indeed, the manager may find that as a result of true and effective
bargaining he has more latitude in managing than ever before. As one
of the foremost students of public personnel administration stated it:
The degree to which collective bargaining is fostered
may well be the degree to which legislative bodies
will release control over the details of personnel
administration. ±
I recommend, therefore, that the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command reproduce and distribute copies of this thesis to all CEC
Officers on active duty to be used as an extremely short course on the
history and evolution of the national policy on labor-management relations
2
in the federal government. It could be used, along with "Employee-
Management Relations in the Public Service," a bibliography published
by the U. S. Department of Labor in September, 1967, as the basis for a
brief course in the Public Works Curriculum of the Basic Course at the
0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (5th ed. , New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 248.
2
For those who are interested in more depth I would recommend the
books of Hart, Vosloo, and Roberts as excellent sources and Lewis' Naval
Institute Proceedings article for some interesting early Navy history.
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Civil Engineer Corps Officers' School to acquaint newly commissioned
CEC Officers with this area.
I believe that the answers to the questionnaire, coupled with the
goals of educating "100 percent of the Regular Officers in each year
group to the Master's level" and "a prescribed number of management
courses should be included in technical postgraduate programs" provide
ample justification for another recommendation. That recommendation is
that one of the management electives in the postgraduate program be a
course in labor-management relations. A course such as 15.312 - Labor
Management Relations - at M. I. T. , while not dealing specifically with
federal employees, does provide an understanding of the "structure and
functioning of management and unions in handling of industrial relations;
union policies; problems likely to arise; reconciliation of union and
2
management policies; and Public policy in labor-management relations."
A course similar to this one would provide the CEC Officer with an
understanding of the union philosophy and unionism's goals and would
better equip him to adequately cope with the personnel and labor-
management problems which he will inevitably encounter.
As one senior Civil Engineer Corps Officer, in responding to the
questionnaire, put it:
To me, it looks like the next fifty years are going
to be a "lot of fun" ... for a lot of people in
management as they learn to accommodate their
actions and attitudes to the reactions of the union
employees.




"Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bulletin 68/69,' (Cambridge,
Mass., July, 1968), p. 317.
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There is no guarantee that extending full collective bargaining to
government workers will increase the efficiency of the public service
and the personal satisfaction of the government worker, but the promise
lies in the fact that it might. If the CEC Officer is not to be
frustrated by this movement, he must at least know about it and under-
stand it. For the U. S. labor movement in the future, the government -
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2. Has a formal agreement been signed? Yes No
3. If an agreement has been signed, have first and middle level
supervisors received training in the interpretation and administration
of the agreement? Yes No
4. How was the training accomplished and how thorough was it?
5. Are you involved with labor/industrial relations to a?
Small degree Moderate degree Great degree
6. Have you had formal labor/industrial relations training?
None Seminars or workshops Navy or other training course_
College courses Correspondence courses
7. In the near future and in relation to the present, do you think
labor/industrial relations in the Navy will be?
Of the same importance Less important More important
8. Do you think federal government employees in unions will become?
Less militant More militant No change
9. Do you think federal government employees will ever advocate their
right to strike? Yes No
10. Do you think they should have the right to strike?
Not at all In some agencies and departments
In the Defense Department agencies
11. Do you feel that your training in labor/industrial relations has
been sufficient? Yes No
12. Should Navy officers have some formal training in college in labor/
industrial relations? Yes No
Please feel free to make any additional narrative comments you wish on
the reverse side.
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